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Mapping and Governing the Tri-layered Economy with the Shared Resources 
toward a Novel Commons
CheolSoo PARK 
Abstract 
This article is intended to extend the conventional dichotomy of the market-state/
government in economics by setting out a framework for a tri-layered socio-macro 
economy with diverse institutional arrangements beyond the two domains dichotomy. 
The study introduces a new way of looking at a shared resource toward a novel 
Commons that is subject to a social dilemma. I argue adopting and applying the 
approach pioneered by Elinor Ostrom and other collaborating scholars to a commons 
arrangements in the natural environment provides a template or platform for 
examining the governance mechanism in the new commons such as knowledge 
commons in the cultural environment as well as for understanding properties of 
organizations and the self-decentralized governance within the social economy 
domain in addition to both market and public economy domains. The novel 
framework helps to clarify the policy process in conjunction with the trilateral or tri-
layered property regimes in practical and implemental senses in order for solving the 
social and economic problems both at local-spatial location and in contemporary era. 
Keywords: social dilemma, IAD framework, shared resources, the new Commons, 
governance, policy process, the market-state dichotomy, a tri-layered socio-macro 
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Introduction 
Many policy and economic problems have attributes of social dilemmas. The dilemma is a 
situation in which social problems occur. A social dilemma arises when too many group 
PHPEHUVFKRRVHWRSXUVXHLQGLYLGXDOSUR¿WDQGLPPHGLDWHVDWLVIDFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQEHKDYH
in the group’s best long-term interests. Social dilemmas can take many forms and are 
studied across disciplines including psychology, economics, and political science and 
others as well. For several decades, generations of scholars had been challenged to 
reexamine  the  Commons  as  a  governing  institutional  arrangement  as  an  adjunct  to 
WKH WZR GRPLQDQW WRSGRZQ VROXWLRQV JRYHUQPHQW UHJXODWLRQ DQG SULYDWL]DWLRQ DV
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institutional arrangements.  
In the action arena under which actors or organizations perform activities, the social 
HFRQRP\DQGWKHQHZIRUPVRIVRFLDOHFRQRP\RUJDQL]DWLRQV6(2VDUHHPHUJLQJDVDQ
alternative domain where social dilemma might be mitigated under certain conditions. 
They are, though, in no way a new phenomena, and have been reinvigorated in recent 
GHFDGHV DQG IXUWKHU EHHQ QRWHG DIWHU WKH UHFHQW ZRUOG ¿QDQFLDO FULVLV D FULVLV ZKLFK
exposed some serious limitations to the current economic system. Challenges especially 
DIWHU WKH JOREDOL]DWLRQ ¿QDQFLDOL]DWLRQ DQG WHFKQRORJLFDO SURJUHVV UHVXOWLQJ LQ WKH
polarization of society in conjunction with high growth after WWII, have contributed to the 
reinvigoration of the new sector or domain with the diverse institutional arrangements 
ZKHUHDQDOWHUQDWLYHPHFKDQLVPRIJRYHUQDQFH WR¿OO WKHJDS OHIWE\VXFKFRQYHQWLRQDO
institutions as both markets and the state. The rediscovery of the social economy domain 
6('DQG6(2VZLWKLQ6('DQGDFURVVGRPDLQVVRFLHW\DUHDOVRH[SHFWHGWRSOD\VXFK
UROHV%RWKLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGDFWRUVZLWKLQWKHPKDYHWKHPVHOYHVUHTXLUHGWREHLQQRYDWLYH
adaptable, and responsive to the local needs of community or/and the local region when 
provided with opportunities and an environment which allows and enables them to reveal 
WKHLUSRWHQWLDOLQIXO¿OOLQJFHUWDLQJRDOVRUYDOXHVWKH\VHW
To address the issues mentioned above, we need to probe more deeply into the working 
architecture of the contemporary economic system and the different institutional roles within 
the economic system at large. The purpose of this study is to learn this methodology from a 
P\ULDGRISHUVSHFWLYHVRI WKH ,QVWLWXWLRQDO$QDO\VLVDQG 'HYHORSPHQW ,$')UDPHZRUN
developed by Ostrom and her  colleagues, in order to improve understanding governing 
resources with variety of characteristics and social interaction. Through adopting and 
modifying a framework approach, we are enable to address such social dilemma facing a 
community such as the commons dilemma, searching the underlying structures for these 
particular situations.        
A new approach of the commons employed in the study helps to recognize how traditional 
economists undervalues the importance of shared assets with a distinct bias in favor of 
private property. For example, among others, one bias is how rules and principles have 
LQÀXHQFHGWKHJRYHUQDQFHRIWKHFRPPRQVDVDVKDUHGUHVRXUFHRUDSURSHUW\DUUDQJHPHQW
and the underlying structural factors within a framework for studying problems in 
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conjunction with the economy and society inclusive social economy domain. To improve 
the understanding of shared resources and the Commons, we must pay attention to the 
LPSRUWDQFH RI DFWRUV VXFK DV LQGLYLGXDOV DQG RUJDQL]DWLRQV DQG WKH UHTXLUHPHQW IRU
governance to recognize their diverse roles within the analytical framework. It is 
accompanied by their wider role within community as an underlying structure of the action 
arena at the multiple levels, at levels both at regional and the national levels.
7KHFRQWULEXWLRQVRIWKLVVWXG\DUHWZRIROGV$W¿UVWWKRXJKWKHUHZHUHVRPHHIIRUWVLQ
the previous study in positioning organizations as actors in the action arena, those are in the 
lack of compatibility with theoretical perspectives with which all types of organizations are 
interacting with each other for activities and transactions across domains in the architecture 
RI HFRQRP\ DW ODUJH ,Q RUGHU WR ¿OO WKHVH JDSV WKLV VWXG\ DGRSWV DQG OHDUQV IURP WKH
framework approach in section II. The second contribution is that, in order to derive 
empirical implications, we try to do mapping cases of organizations as actors by setting 
up the criteria of incentives and drawing common attributes in the institutional framework 
whose constituents are components of full spectrum economy.  
The study is structured as follows. The dramas of Commons in studying institutions are 
discussed in chapter one. It includes commons, old and new, in studying institutions and 
this chapter summarizes what we learn for building on Ostrom’s institutional framework 
approach. Chapter two outlines a framework for analyzing the shared resources with 
institutional arrangements that govern the Commons. In chapter three, mapping 
organizations and institutions in Commons environments, through which conduct the 
novel attempt to do mapping organizations onto the spectrum of the incentive space within 
the full domain of the economy at large. We also try to identify the relational aspects 
between motivation and organizations in order to identify attributes of the action arena 
described in the institutional framework and development developed by Ostrom that are 
PD\EHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHDUFKLWHFWXUHRI³HFRQRP\DWODUJH´,QWKHODVWchapter, we 
discuss issues regarding the new commons in the cultural environment for the possible 
PRGL¿FDWLRQRIWKHIUDPHZRUNDVUHVHDUFKDJHQGDIRUIXWXUHVWXG\
I.  Dramas of the Commons in Studying Institutions 
1.1 The Commons in studying Institutions
The commons is an important issue when we intend to use to analyze global and local 
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The commons is an important issue when we intend to use to analyze global and local 
resources on Earth. There has been long history, in both the academic and practical 
worlds, regarding traditional commons for feasible solutions to the exploitation of natural 
resources and to the environment.
Hardin’s allegory$QDUWLFOHHQWLWOHG³7KHWUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQV´E\*DUUHQ+DUGLQ
LQLQWKHMRXUQDOScience played a key role in reintroducing the debate on the commons, 
a debate with a long history of controversies. This article had a profound impact on social 
science, including economics. The hypothesis and arguments thereafter became a reference 
for the problems that traditionally occur in the area of natural resources area. The essence 
RIWKHSUREOHPLVWKDWUHVRXUFHVDUHRYHUH[SORLWHGEHFDXVHDJHQWVRUDFWRUVSOD\HUVZDQW
WR KDYH WKH PD[LPXP EHQH¿WV DV D FRQVHTXHQFH RI D VHO¿VK LQGLYLGXDO EHKDYLRU 7KH
phenomena was referred as the tragedy of the commons which is a result of a collective 
action or decision. 
%DVHGXSRQDVWRU\OLQHIURPKLVWRULFDOFDVHVVXFKDVQRQUHJXODWHGH[WUDWHUULWRULDO¿VKLQJ
zones and that of common lands in England before the Industrial Revolution, Hardin 
DUJXHGWKDW³LQIDFWZKHQDFFHVVWRDUHVRXUFHLVIUHHDQGLWLVQRWGH¿QHGE\SULYDWHRU
public property, choices of rational individuals and the depletion of this resource.” Hardin 
proposed several measures to preserve resources under this social dilemma, given the 
presumption that tragedy is inevitable. He suggested that only privatization of it or, in 
second place, resort to making it state property, would be able to eliminate this behavour 
DQGVDIHJXDUGWKHUHVRXUFH)URPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRIHI¿FLHQF\KLVSUHVFULSWLRQLPSOLHV
that the commons should probably be replaced by systems of public or personal ownership 
which corresponds to two solutions through either the market or the state. This assumes 
that self-governance of common goods is impossible. 
Ostrom’s allegory2VWURPFULWLFDOO\UHYLHZHGWKH WDOHRI+DUGLQDQGDUJXHG
that the tragedy of the common is not necessarily tragic and furthermore the dilemma 
might be solved in an alternative institutional arrangement when some conditions were 
VDWLV¿HGZKLFKZHZLOOGLVFXVVLQVHFWLRQ,,7KHVLWXDWLRQLVFDOOHGDVWKHFRPHG\RIWKH
commons. Many scholars including Ostrom and Hess, based on the new political economy 
of commons, developed an original criticism of Hardin’s theory, focusing on his approach 
and the underlying assumptions. Academic contributions extend our understanding of how 
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resources are shared and successfully managed or/and failed to be managed in the 
framework. Their views renew the theory of property rights and of public or collective 
JRRGVVRWKDWWKH\GH¿QHFRPPRQVDFFRUGLQJWRGLIIHUHQWFULWHULDZLWKLQDIUDPHZRUN
rather than one of previous studies. From analytical perspective, Ostrom further explained 
that a slight change from outside the model of Hardin’s or just recognizing that some other 
factor is relevant to the situation, or relaxing one of the assumptions, may result in 
solutions that are often not considered. 
Problem solving beyond a conventional dichotomy of institutional arrangements: 
This criticism by Ostrom and others reveals important implications for social science, 
especially for social-political macroeconomics, as well as for policy prescriptions. Decades 
of research paid attentions to solve the problem of the commons problem as a sort of a 
solution to the  social  dilemma.  As  an alternative  institutional  arrangement,  cooperation 
to  avoid tragedy becomes theoretically feasible without resort to one of Hardin's two 
solutions: either government FRPPDQGDQGFRQWURO PLFURPDQDJHPHQWleviathan 
JRYHUQPHQW UHJXODWLRQ RU SULYDWH SURSHUW\HQDEOHG PDUNHWV privatization (market 
UHJXODWLRQ ,Q WHUPV RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO HFRQRPLFV WKLV LPSOLHV WKDW FRPPXQLW\
management, social norms, and other institutional arrangements could be relevant solutions 
that can and often do outperform the dominant institutional arrangement according to 
solutions based upon the dichotomy of either/both government regulation or/and market 
regulation. 
Lessons learning from Ostrom’s work: To deepen understanding the main idea, it is 
helpful to introduce lessons from the academic contributions by Ostrom and other studies. 
Let me discuss these lessons and the novel perspectives that researchers could learn from 
them in studying institutions and the commons old and new%H\RQGUHFRJQL]LQJWKHOLPLWV
of models and acknowledging what is theoretically feasible, in Governing The Commons: 
The Evolution Of Institutions For Collective Action2VWURPH[SODLQHGKRZPRGHOV
such as the tragedy of the commons lead to myopic analyses of solutions and policy 
prescriptions, ignoring alternative institutional arrangement that may provide more 
effective ways for governance, based on study on actual resource system and governance 
㻝㻕 䚷For example, the redefinition of the distinction between res nullius and res communes, the concept of the 
proprietary structure as a bundle of rights, the typology of goods and the principles of governance. 
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institutions in the real world. 
The cumulative results by Ostrom about how self-organized community governance often 
is an effective alternative for a wide range of shared resources.  In some contexts, communities, 
as self-organized and governing institutional arrangements, can and do solve the tragedy of 
the commons, collective action, and other related resource management problems without 
WXUQLQJWRJRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQRUPDUNHWGULYHQDOORFDWLRQ7KH\GRVRLQDYDULHW\RI
ways, often relying on informal mechanisms for coordinating behavior. However, community 
solutions sometimes succeed and  sometimes fail. A lesson from previous study  is that 
context matters 0DGLVRQ )ULVFKPDQQ DQG 6WUDQGEXUJ   ,W LV ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW
arguments of Orstom’s had been built upon a basic notion that people sometimes cooperate 
effectively and build self-manageable institutions to enable sustainable shared use of common 
pooled resources. The spectrum of vision brought  by Ostrom help  improve  understanding 
not  only of  informal institutions,  but  also of  formal  institutions  by  revealing  the  many 
different ways in that government,  market, and  community institutions work together.  In 
other  words, from an economics perspective, three distinct domains within a framework of 
socio-economy, such as market economy domain, public/government economy domain, and 
community/social economy domain, depend on each other to be successful.
Commons Old and New:  To improve  understanding mechanisms  governing  commons 
ROGDQGQHZ2VWURPLQWURGXFHGGH¿QLWLRQRIFRPPRQJRRGVZLWKLQQRWRQO\WKHLQWULQVLF
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIJRRGVEXWDOVRWKHVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHRIWKHJRYHUQDQFHRIFRPPRQ%DVHG
on the new political economy of commons, Ostrom developed an original criticism of 
Hardin’s approach, the tragedy of the commons. This new approach renews the theory of 
SURSHUW\ULJKWVDQGRISXEOLFRUFROOHFWLYHJRRGVWRDUULYHDWDGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHFRPPRQV. 
Multi-dimensionality of Goods and the Shared Resources: Ideas of  shared  resource 
or  the commons  in  terms  of a global  dimension  are  also  important to  deepen theoretical 
aspects  of institutional arrangements for various reasons. Two among others  are: In the 
traditional  economics  of  development  aspect, there  are  large portion of  people who are 
OLYLQJRQOHVVWKDQDwho day still depend in some way on commonly held resources. 
䚷㻌 It was organized aroundFHQWUDOHOHPHQWV  WKHUHGHILQLWLRQRI WKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQUHVQXOOLXVDQGUHV
FRPPXQHVWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHSURSULHWDU\VWUXFWXUHDVDEXQGOHRIULJKWVWKHW\SRORJ\RIJRRGVDQGWKH
principles of governance, management principles, cooperative notions of individuals beyond homo economicus.
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In the advanced countries, the concept of the commons is also spreading to new areas, 
FDOOHGDVWKH³new commons”. In order to understand  what  this variety of commons we 
need to understand their  fundamental characteristic as a resource itself. The essential 
feature of a common good or common resource is that they share one characteristic with 
private property and another with public goods.  
)LJXUH,&ODVVL¿FDWLRQRI*RRGVEDVHGRQ&ULWHULD6XEVWUDFWDELOLW\DQG([FOXVLRQ
Goods-Type 
               vs 
Criteria 
Subtractability and Rivality
High Low
Exculsion
Easy
'LI¿FXOW
Private goods Club goods, Toll goods
&RPPRQV&RPPRQSRROUHVRXUFH Public goods 
Note:  Ostrom（）  
7KHUHDUHIRXUW\SHVRIJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVDVLQ¿JXUH,7KHGLOHPPDVLQWKHVRFLHW\
are related to their production and consumption in many situations. Subtractability refers 
to how the extent of how one’s  consumption of  a  unit of the  resource  lowers the others, 
while  exclusion  refers  to the extent of how costly it is to exclude others  from consumption 
of that resource. Private goods and services are  in high  subtractability  and low cost of 
H[FOXVLRQ IUDPH 7KH\ FDQ EH  SURGXFHG  HI¿FLHQWO\  WKURXJK WKH SURFHVV RI PDUNHW
H[FKDQJH,QRUGHUWRRSHUDWHWKRVHDFWLYLWLHVRIWUDQVDFWLRQHI¿FLHQWO\PDUNHWPXVWEH
located  within the  supporting  framework  of  such public goods as rule of law, secure 
property rights, and a medium of exchange. Public goods are characterized as 
QRQVXEWUDFWDELOLW\DQGDKLJKFRVWRIH[FOXVLRQVLQFHWKH\DUHQRWH[FOXGDEOH%\VWUXFWXUH
free-rider problem results in the less production and provision of public goods and services 
WKDQ RQH SUHGLFWHG E\ HI¿FLHQF\ LQ WKH PDUNHW 7ROO JRRGV RU WKH FOXE JRRGV ZKHQ
FRQVXPSWLRQ FDQH UHVWULFWHG WR D GH¿QHG FOXE PHPEHUV DUH LQ WKH VHFWLRQV RI
QRQVXEWUDFWDELOLW\DQGORZFRVWRIH[FOXVLRQ+RZHYHUUHDOL]DWLRQRISRWHQWLDOQHWEHQH¿WV
to consumers can be reduced greatly due to congestion effects, though the cost of exclusion 
is low.
― 299 ―
―8―
CheolSoo PARK
&RPPRQSRROUHVRXUFHV&35VRUFRPPRQUHVRXUFHV,  like public goods,  are not 
³H[FOXGDEOH´7KHFRPPRQUHVRXUFHLVWRRH[WHQVLYHWRNHHSSHRSOHRXWYHU\HDVLO\%XW
WKH\DUHDOVR³VXEWUDFWDEOH´RU³ULYDOURXV´OLNHSULYDWHSURSHUW\,IRQHSHUVRQXVHVWKHP
another’s access is diminished. The resource units are extracted or appropriated from a 
common pool. We can suppose three situations about how the resulting resources or 
SURGXFWVPD\EHXVHGLE\WKHDSSURSULDWRUIRUFRQVXPSWLRQLLXVHGDVLQSXWVLQVRPH
SURGXFWLRQSURFHVVDQGRULLLH[FKDQJHGZLWKRWKHUV,QDQRSHQDFFHVV&35ZLWKQR
governance arrangements in operation as in Hardin’s hypothesis, appropriation will tend to 
over-exploit the resources and may destroy the resource itself. It is tragedy of the commons 
that comes in within a complex institutional framework we will discuss. It is related with 
such various forms of notions as appropriation externality, rent dissipation, assignment 
problems, technological externality and the provision of infrastructure. 
$VDEDFNJURXQGRIDQHZFDWHJRU\SXEOLFFRPPRQJRRGVEDVHGRQ³VXEWUDFWDELOLW\´
QRWLRQVKRZQLQWKHJUDSKLFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHW\SHVRI³JRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVRUUHVRXUFHV´
there is a notion of ownership of commons as a bundle of rights4). In addition to the problem 
of the commons as an economic theory of property, this notion has been applied to the 
economic theory of common property as the mixing property that is complementary to the 
LPSRUWDQFH RIZHOOGH¿QHG SULYDWH SURSHUW\ ULJKWV DV D FHQWUDO IDFWRU IRU GHYHORSPHQW
%HFDXVH GLIIHUHQW FRPSRQHQWV RI D UHVRXUFH RU JRRGV RU VHUYLFH PD\ VLPXOWDQHRXVO\
express properties of different types of goods, we need to consider  not only the exploiting 
side but also where to use in terms of category of goods (demand side that is connected 
DPRQJJRRGVW\SH)RUH[DPSOHDUHVRXUFHWDNHQIURPDFRPPRQSRROPD\EHFRQVXPHG
as a private goods or used in  the production of a club/toll or public goods. Interaction 
EHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWFDWHJRU\RIJRRGVWKURXJKDFWRUVRUSDUWLFLSDQWVFRXOGEHUHÀHFWHGE\
VKLIWLQJVSDFHVLQWKHPDWUL[LQ)LJXUH,
㻟㻕䚷㻌The term commons is informally used to refer to public goods, common pool resources, or any area with uncer-
tain property rights. Since, for analytical purposes, it is necessary to be more specific, there have been long efforts 
among scholars. 
㻠㻕䚷㻌2VWURPKDGUDLVHGTXHVWLRQVRQ1RUWK¶VWKHRULHVUHJDUGLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIZHOOGHILQHGSULYDWH
property rights as a central factor for development. Ostrom considered the problem of commons as a critical 
continuation, explicit or implicit, of the theory of property rights by Douglas C. North, and thus also was interested 
in the theoretical renewal of neoliberal economic theory of property.
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)LJXUH,&ODVVL¿FDWLRQVRI$FWRUVDQG5HVRXUFHV
ACTORS Antisubstractability Substactability Nonsubstractability
Individual Private goods
Local Community Commons Club goods
Public Network Open access Public goods
Different Types of Goods and Different Institutional Arrangements:  In applications 
of the IAD framework, attentions is paid to the possibility  that a particular goods  or 
service activity  may have  the properties of different types  of  goods under  different 
institutional settings. It is thus important to understand the linkages between  resources and 
property rights regimes. The diversity  of property  rights  regimes  that  can be used  to 
regulate  the use of common-pool resources has a wide spectrum, including the broad 
categories of government ownership, private ownership, and ownership by a community. 
In general, humans using resources of this type face at least two underlying incentive 
SUREOHPV7KH¿UVWRQHLVWKHSUREOHPRIRYHUXVHFRQJHVWLRQRUHYHQGHVWUXFWLRQEHFDXVH
RQHSHUVRQ¶VXVHVXEWUDFWVIURPWKHEHQH¿WVDYDLODEOHWRRWKHUV7KHVHFRQGRQHLVWKHIUHH
ULGHUSUREOHPWKDWVWHPVIURPWKHFRVWRUGLI¿FXOW\RIH[FOXGLQJVRPHLQGLYLGXDOVIURPWKH
EHQH¿WV JHQHUDWHG E\ WKH UHVRXUFH7KH EHQH¿WV RIPDLQWDLQLQJ DQG HQIRUFLQJ UXOHV RI
access and exclusion go to all users, regardless of whether they have paid a fair share of the 
costs. 
The institutions  that humans devise to regulate the use of common-pool resources must 
somehow  try  to  cope with these  two basic  incentive problems. They struggle with how 
to prevent overuse and how to ensure contributions to the mechanisms used to maintain 
ERWKWKHUHVRXUFHDQGWKHLQVWLWXWLRQLWVHOI7KHUHVHHPVZLGHURRPIRUXVWRLGHQWLI\³QHZ
FRPPRQV´VXFKQHZLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVDV WKH LQWHUQHWDQGDFFXPXODWHGNQRZOHGJHRU WR
claim as commons things not always seen that way. The recent study of the Commons are 
extending the concept of the commons from traditional natural resources to things such as 
medicine, knowledge and what are usually seen as local and global public goods, like the 
cities and the oceans.
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1.2 Learning and Building from Ostrom’s Institutional Framework Approach
As we discussed above, there  are various advantages  to base  the proposed  framework on 
Ostrom’s  work on natural resource  environment. Research on institutional arrangements 
in conjunction with both problems and solutions regarding the shared resource and the 
FRPPRQVROGDQGQHZ LVFKDOOHQJLQJE\  OHDQLQJ  VLJQL¿FDQW OHVVRQV  IURP 2VWURP¶V
institutional  framework approach. This section outlines two out of many: the one 
substantive and the other methodological, following front-runners’s adoption, Frischamann 
DQG2VWURP2QHOHVVRQLVDSUDFWLFDOOHVVRQWRIDFHUHDOLW\EH\RQGWKHELQDU\
government-or-market view, the other is a methodology to study the reality.    
One lesson is a practical lesson to face reality beyond the binary government-or-market 
view. Ostrom emphasized that reality is much more complicated than a dichotomy of 
government-or-market thinking. The deep problem (with Hardin’s tragedy of the common 
DOOHJRU\LVWKHP\RSLDWKDWWKHPRGHOLQGXFHGDQGWKHELQDU\JRYHUQPHQWRUPDUNHW
prescriptions  suggests. Ostrom  pointed  out  that we  consistently  make  the mistake 
of  thinking  in binary terms, individual  or social,  private or public, market or government, 
2VWURP, Frischamann, 7KHRWKHU OHVVRQ  LV D PHWKRGRORJ\  WR VWXG\ WKH
reality. This is Ostrom’s  approach  for  how  should  one go  about  studying  reality  by 
facilitating research  on  these  institutions across diverse resource  systems.  Ostrom 
GHYHORSHGDVFLHQWL¿FDSSURDFKWRVWXG\LQJDQGHYDOXDWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVEDVHGXSRQ
the methodology  that is bridging disciplines, and enabling systematic, collaborative 
social science, in  part, in order to avoid path dependencies. Applying the IAD framework 
enables scholars to examine the impact of structural variables on outcomes. Facing a 
particular situation with dilemmas, the institutional approach helps to specify diverse ways 
of owning and governing  resource, such as individual ownership, joint ownership by a 
community, and different  forms of government ownership, on investment, harvesting, 
SURWHFWLRQDQGPDQDJLQJDFWLYLWLHVDQGWKHLUFRQVHTXHQFHVRQUHVRXUFHFRQGLWLRQV
1.3. Institutional Frameworks, Theories, and Models
The  study  of institutions  depends  on  theoretical  work  undertaken at three levels  of such 
VSHFL¿FLW\ DV frameworks, theories, and models, while analysis conducted at each level 
SURYLGHGLIIHUHQWGHJUHHVRIVSHFL¿FLW\WKDWLVFRQWLQJHQWRQDSDUWLFXODUSUREOHP2VWURP
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  H[SODLQHG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQa research framework, theories, and 
models :
³The development and use of a general framework helps to identify the elements (relationships 
DPRQJ WKHVH HOHPHQWV WKDW RQH QHHGV WR FRQVLGHU IRU LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQDO\VLV )UDPHZRUNV«
provide the most general list of variables that should be used to analyze all types of institutional 
arrangements. Frameworks provide a meta-theoretical language that can be used to compare 
theories. Many differences in surface reality can result from the way these variables combine 
with or interact with one another. Thus, the elements contained in a framework help analysts 
JHQHUDWHWKHTXHVWLRQVWKDWQHHGWREHDGGUHVVHGZKHQWKH\¿UVWFRQGXFWDQDQDO\VLV´
³7KHGHYHORSPHQW DQGXVHRI theories enable the analyst to specify which elements of the 
IUDPHZRUNDUHSDUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWWRFHUWDLQNLQGVRITXHVWLRQVDQGWRPDNHJHQHUDOZRUNLQJ
DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW WKHVH HOHPHQWV7KXV WKHRULHV IRFXV RQ D IUDPHZRUN DQGPDNH VSHFL¿F
assumptions that are necessary for an analyst to diagnose a phenomenon, explain its processes, 
and predict outcomes. Several theories are usually compatible with any framework. Economic 
theory, game theory, transaction cost theory, social choice theory, covenantal theory, and theories 
of public goods and common-pool resources are all compatible with the IAD framework.” 
³7KH GHYHORSPHQW DQG XVH RI models make precise assumptions about a limited set of 
parameters and variables. Logic, mathematics, game theory, experimentation and simulation, 
DQGRWKHUPHDQVDUHXVHGWRH[SORUHV\VWHPDWLFDOO\WKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHVHDVVXPSWLRQVLQD
limited set of outcomes. Multiple models are compatible with most theories.” 
II. Developing for Framework for Analyzing of the Shared Resources
This chapter introduces the IAD framework approach for natural resource commons,  developed 
E\2VWURPDQGFROOHDJXHV%HIRUHH[SODLQLQJHOHPHQWVRIWKHIUDPHZRUNLWLVKHOSIXO
understanding the crucial aspects of the framework approach that are distinguishable from 
existing methodologies. 
2.1 Challenges and notions across disciplines for a coherent analysis
There are several important notions that are related with the framework adopted in this 
DUWLFOHDQGVRPHGLI¿FXOWLHVWRRYHUFRPHLQYROYHGLQVWXG\LQJLQVWLWXWLRQVIRUDFRKHUHQW
approach across disciplines. The conceptual categories and their analytical perspectives 
KDV EHHQ SOD\LQJ WKH XVHIXO UROH DV WKH ³ODQJXDJH´ IRU VFKRODUO\ LQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\
FROODERUDWLRQ)RUWKHFRKHUHQWGHVFULSWLRQLQWKLVDUWLFOHZHDGRSWQRWLRQVDQGGH¿QLWLRQV
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WKDWDUHVKDUHGZLWKUHVHDUFKHURQWKHFRPPRQVPDLQO\E\2VWURPRQQDWXUDO
UHVRXUFHV+HVVDQG2VWURPRQNQRZOHGJHFRPPRQDQG0DGLVRQHWDORQ
OHJDO HFRQRPLFV DPRQJ RWKHUV *LYHQ WKH YDULHW\ DQG FRQIXVLRQ RYHU GH¿QLWLRQV DQG
XVDJHVLQFRQFHSWDQGWHUPLQRORJ\ZHFRQ¿QHQRWLRQVXVHGLQWKLVVWXG\DQGVXPPDUL]H
them from the previous literatures as follows: the commons, common-pool  resources, 
institutions, organizations, rules, norms, strategies, institutional arrangements, though 
they are not comprehensive.
The notion of the commons: given analytical advantages existing in separating the concept 
of the resource or goods valued by humans from the concept of the rules that may be used 
to govern and manage the behavior and actions of humans using these resources. A 
common-pool resource is a valued natural or human-made resource or facility that is 
available to more than one person and subject to degradation as a result of overuse. 
Common-pool  resources  can  be characterized  as  ones  for which  exclusion  from  the 
resource  is  costly  and  one  person’s  use subtracts from what is available to others. In the 
long history of social  science  regarding institutions, a major challenge was just to provide 
D FRKHUHQW GH¿QLWLRQ RI WKH WHUP LQVWLWXWLRQ ,Q WKLV DUWLFOH institution refers to many 
different types of entities, including both organizations and the rules used to structure 
patterns of interaction  within and across organizations.  In  other words, institution includes 
both an organizational entity and the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive 
situations  organized by  rules, norms, and strategies5XOHVFRXOGEHGH¿QHGDVVKDUHG
SUHVFULSWLRQV PXVW PXVW QRW RU PD\ WKDW DUH PXWXDOO\ XQGHUVWRRG DQG SUHGLFWDEO\
enforced in particular situations by agents responsible for monitoring conduct and for 
LPSRVLQJVDQFWLRQV%\normsWKHVHFRXOGEHGH¿QHGDVVKDUHGSUHVFULSWLRQVWKDWWHQGWREH
enforced by the participants themselves  through internally and externally imposed  costs 
DQGLQGXFHPHQWV%\strategies, is meant the  regularized plans  that individuals make 
within the structure of incentives produced by rules,  norms, and expectations of  the likely 
behavior of  others in a situation affected by relevant physical and material conditions. 
Though we sometimes will use these interchangeably, we will distinguish two terms: 
organizations and institutionsLQDVHQVHWKDWRUJDQL]HGHQWLWLHVRUJDQL]DWLRQVXFKDV
EXLOGLQJV RU WKH OHJDOO\  UHJLVWHUHG DQG ORFDWHG DUH TXLWH visible, however, institutions 
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themselves are invisible7RGHYHORSDFRKHUHQWDSSURDFK WKHVWXG\GH¿QHVXFKGLYHUVH
types of institutional arrangements LQFOXGLQJ PDUNHWV KLHUDUFKLHV ¿UPV IDPLOLHV
voluntary associations, national governments, and international regimes, which need 
multiple inputs from diverse disciplines for the fruitful meanings and notions.  
2.2 Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework and the Commons 
Though the IAD framework for institutional and structural changes was initially  illustrated 
primarily  with  reference to work on the theory of  common- pool  resources  dealing with 
various types of natural resources, called a traditional resource, it seems also appropriate 
for  extending toward the other sorts of resources where both new technologies are 
developing at rapid rate as well as the increase of diverse demands.
An  institutional framework approach  allows us to identify  the major types of structural 
YDULDEOHV WKHPRVWJHQHUDO VHWRIYDULDEOHV WKDW VKRXOGEHXVHG WRDQDO\]HDOO W\SHVRI
VHWWLQJVUHOHYDQWIRUWKHIUDPHZRUNDGDSWHGLQTXHVWLRQE\SUHVHQWLQJWRVRPHH[WHQWLQDOO
institutional arrangements,  though   value of  variables  may  differ  according  to  different 
institutional  arrangement. In this sense, the IAD framework is a multi-tier conceptual map 
VHH)LJXUH,,7KHPDSLQWKHIUDPHZRUNGLYLGHVWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIVXFKYDULDEOHVLQWR
EORFNVRUJURXSVZKLFKKDGLQLWLDOO\GHYHORSHGE\2VWURPDQGRWKHUGLVFLSOLQHV
oriented researchers for natural common-pool resources, and then has applied by 
)ULVFKPDQQHWDOLQWKH¿HOGRIOHJDOHFRQRPLFVDPRQJRWKHUVLQRUGHUWRLPSURYH
understanding of the constructed common resources such as knowledge and cultural 
resources in the new environment.
Steps for a framework approach in analyzing a social problem: The framework 
consists of steps in analyzing a problem solving to solve in a situation. The foundation of 
the framework-driven analysis is divides it into four blocks or clusters of variables as 
LOOXVWUDWHG LQ)LJXUH ,, L WR LGHQWLI\DFRQFHSWXDOXQLWV LL WRXQGHUVWDQG WKH LQLWLDO
structure of an action arena, that is, the underlying factors or the exogenous variables as the 
VWUXFWXUDODVSHFWVDQGLLLWKHDFWLRQDUHQDWRH[DPLQHKRZVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIUXOHV
㻡㻕䚷㻌Given the multiple languages used across disciplines, a coherent institutional framework is needed to allow for 
expression and comparison of diverse theories and models of theories applied to particular puzzles and problem 
settings.  
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state of the world, and nature of the community affect the values the variables characterizing 
DFWLRQDUHQDVLYWKHSDWWHUQVRILQWHUDFWLRQVDQGRXWFRPHV7KHVHFWLRQZLOOH[SODLQZKDW
the role of each block is. 
)LJXUH,,$)UDPHZRUNIRU,QVWLWXWLRQDO$QDO\VLVIRUWKHFRQYHQWLRQDO&RPPRQV 
Biophysical
Action
㻭㻯㼀㻵㻻㻺
㻌㻭㻾㻱㻺㻭
Characteristics =
Attributes of the
Community =
Rules-in-Use =
㻵㼐㼑㼍㼟
㻭㼞㼠㼕㼒㼍㼏㼠㼟
㻲㼍㼏㼕㼘㼕㼠㼕㼑㼟
㼁㼟㼑㼞㼟
㻼㼞㼛㼢㼕㼐㼑㼞㼟
㻼㼛㼘㼕㼏㼥㼙㼍㼗㼑㼞㼟
㻯㼛㼚㼟㼠㼕㼠㼡㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘
㻯㼛㼘㼘㼑㼏㼠㼕㼢㼑㻌㻯㼔㼛㼕㼏㼑
㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘
Situations
Actors Criteria
Outcomes
Evaluative
Interactions
Patterns of
2.2.1 Factors of underlying structure 
The block consists of three aspects of attributes: ① biophysical characteristics as foundation 
³SODWIRUP´VWUXFWXUHRUDVWKHSK\VLFDODQGPDWHULDOZRUOGRID5HVRXUFH②community 
³IRXQGDWLRQ´DWWULEXWHVRIFRPPXQLW\SURGXFLQJDQGXVLQJDUHVRXUFHDQG③³UXOHVLQXVH´
RU JRYHUQDQFH PHFKDQLVPV DIIHFWLQJ WKH GHFLVLRQV RI SDUWLFLSDQWV  ,Q WKH VKRUW UXQ
analysis, these attributes will be treated as exogenous variables. In other words, when 
DQDO\]LQJ D SDUWLFXODU VLWXDWLRQ WKHVH DWWULEXWHV RI WKH UHVRXUFH DUH ¿[HG EHFDXVH WKH
underlying structural factors are represented by the selected exogenous variables in the 
framework.
䐟 Biophysical and Technical characteristics: %RWK WKH SK\VLFDO QDWXUH DQG WHFKQLFDO
availability are determinant in terms of the limitations and possibilities of a particular 
resource, i.e. a commons. The scope of characteristics of resource is wide scope from size, 
location, boundaries, capacity, and abundance of the resource. Physical attributes: The 
physical attributes always play a crucial role in shaping the community (or organizations 
ZLWKFHUWDLQJRDOVDQGWKHGHFLVLRQUXOHVDQGSROLFLHV
A mixture of property rights, rather than a conformity of property rights: In Hardin’s 
6RXUFH$GRSWHGIURP+HVVDQG2VWURPWKHUHYLVHGYHUVLRQRI2VWURP*DUGQHUDQG:DONHU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GHVFULSWLRQ LQ WKHPRGHOZKHQ QR SURSHUW\ ULJKWV GH¿QHZKR FDQ XVH D FRPPRQSRRO
resource and how uses are regulated, a common-pool resource is under an open-access 
regime. Human beings in this storyline use common-pool resources by harvesting or 
H[WUDFWLQJ WKH¿QLWHÀRZRIYDOXHGJRRGVSURGXFHGE\ WKHPRUE\SXWWLQJ LQXQZDQWHG
byproducts, thus treating the resource as a sink. The conventional policy prescription is 
based on the assumption that the privatizing ownership is an only institutional arrangement. 
According to modern scholarship on the commons and property theory, however, property, 
as experienced on the ground, is never held in common, but instead always represents a 
PL[RIRZQHUVKLSW\SHV)HQQHOO7KHIDFWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDYLHZWKDWDVORQJDV
some resources cannot be reduced to individual control, propertization should be partial 
because more elements could be placed under common control where the actors as 
FRPPRQHUVVKDUHULJKWVRXWRIEXQGOHRIULJKWV. We adopt perspective from theoretical 
work on the semi-commons that provide the useful implications about challenges in 
thinking attributes of institutional structure and building a framework in this study.  
Technical attributes: The effect of new technology (which may be embedded in the 
SK\VLFDO QDWXUH RI WKH ROG DQG QHZ UHVRXUFHV KDV LQÀXHQFHG RQ VKDSLQJPDQ\ RI WKH
³FRPPRQV´ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI NQRZOHGJH DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ LQ WKH HPHUJLQJ GLJLWDO HUD
HVSHFLDOO\DIWHUWKH:RUOG:LGH:(%RILQWHUQHWGHYHORSPHQWLQ7KHYDVWDPRXQWV
of knowledge that are digitally distributed so that the heterogeneous attributes or 
characteristics of commons and commons dilemmas are emerging and increasing.  Types 
RINQRZOHGJHFRPPRQVDUHEURDGHQLQJQRWQHFHVVDU\FRQ¿QHGWROLEUDULHVDQGDUFKLYHVDV
in the pre-digital era. 
䐠Community (Organizations) Attributes: As a second set of structural factors or variables 
that affect the structure of an action arena is related to the community (or the networked 
RUJDQL]DWLRQVLQZKLFKDQDFWLRQVLWXDWLRQLVORFDWHG7KHDWWULEXWHVDIIHFWLQJWKHVWUXFWXUH
RI DQ DFWLRQ DUHQD LQFOXGH JHQHUDOO\ L FXOWXUDO UHSHUWRLUH VXFK DV DFFHSWHG QRUPV LL
㻢㻕䚷㻌For example, many of the neighborhood and the corporation, as two of the most fundamental institutions in 
FRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHW\FRQVWLWXWH³PL[HGV\VWHPFRPPXQDODQG LQGLYLGXDOSURSHUW\ULJKWV´7KLVSHUVSHFWLYH
provides us a valuable insight that the prototypical tragedy of the commons is produced not by common ownership 
alone, but rather by interacting between individual and collective entitlements. In other words, outcome of 
FRPPRQGLOHPPDLVDOVRUHVXOWHGE\DQLQWHUIDFHDFRPPXQDOO\RZQHGHOHPHQWWKHSDVWXUHDQGLQGLYLGXDOO\
owned elements (cows and the grass they GLJHVW
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common or shared understanding such as the degree of homogeneity of preferences, trust 
LLLUHFLSURFLW\H[SHFWDWLRQRIFRRSHUDWLRQHDFKRWKHUVDQGLYGLVWULEXWLRQRI³UHVRXUFHV´
DQG³VRFLDOFDSLWDO´DPRQJPHPEHUVDVDFWRUV7KHWHUPculture in Ostrom’s framework 
approach is applied to this bundle of attributes. In the situation of natural resources such 
WUDGLWLRQDOFRPPRQVSDVWXUH¿VKHU\DQGJURXQGZDWHULWLVQRWGLI¿FXOWWRLGHQWLI\WKH
entire community that is contributing to, using, managing the commons. However, it is 
PRUHGLI¿FXOW LQ WKHFDVHRIQHZFRPPRQVVXFKDVNQRZOHGJHFRPPRQV LQ LGHQWLI\LQJ
DWWULEXWHVRIWKHHQWLUHFRPPXQLW\+HVVDQG2VWURP7KHFRPPXQLW\RUDVHJPHQW
of the population may be involved with various elements of governance, regulation, 
HQIRUFHPHQWHGXFDWLRQRURWKHUDFWLYLWLHV%\WKLVVWUXFWXUHWKHVWUDWHJLHVDGRSWHGZLWKLQ
action arena and the resulting patterns of interactions are affected by how the values of a 
FRPPXQLW\ LQVWLWXWLRQVRURUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHVKDUHGRUGLYLGHG$V WUDGLWLRQDOFRPPRQV
investigated, the small, homogeneous groups are more likely to be able to sustain a commons. 
,IDFRPPXQLW\RISURYLGHUVDQGGHFLVLRQPDNHUVDUHXQL¿HGDVWRWKHSXUSRVHDQGJRDOVRI
WKHUHVRXUFHVLQTXHVWLRQIRUH[DPSOH LQIRUPDWLRQUHVRXUFHRUNQRZOHGJHFRPPRQVLQ
conjunction with the shared values, then the community could be said to be homogeneous. 
Homogeneity is one of important factor in terms of the ultimate persistency and robustness 
RIDFRPPRQV+HVVDQG2VWURP
䐡Rules-in-use: The third part of an attribute for an action situation is an understanding of 
the relationship between the rules that affect a situation and the resulting outcomes 
JHQHUDWHGE\SDUWLFLSDQWVLVDOVRLPSRUWDQW³5XOHLQXVH´LVXVHGWRGHVLJQDWHDOOUHOHYDQW
aspects of the institutional context within which an action situation is located, including 
formal rule, informal rules/norms, repertoire of strategies, and property rights. Rules 
specify the values of the working components of an action situation in the sense that each 
rule has emerged as the outcome of interaction in an adjacent action at a different level of 
arena of choice in the framework. If an action situation has certain number of working 
parts, then logically the corresponding numbers of rules types could affect the action 
VLWXDWLRQ7KHVHUXOHVDUHRQHRIWKHLPSRUWDQW¿QGLQJVLQWKHWUDGLWLRQDOFRPPRQVUHVHDUFK
WKDWFDPHIURPWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIGHVLJQSULQFLSOHVRIUREXVWORQJHQGXULQJFRPPRQ
SRROUHVRXUFHLQVWLWXWLRQV2VWURP7KHVHZHUHIRXQGDVUHVXOWVRIDODUJH
set of empirical studies on common-pool resource governance. Ostrom, Gardner, and 
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:DONHURXWOLQHGEURDGW\SHVRIUXOHVWKDWRSHUDWHFRQ¿JXUDOO\WRDIIHFWWKH
VWUXFWXUHRIDQDFWLRQVLWXDWLRQVXFKDVWKHIROORZLQJW\SHVRI³UXOHVLQXVH´RU³SULQFLSOHV´
Boundary rules that specify how actors are to be chosen to enter or leave a situation 
FOHDUO\ GH¿QHG ERXQGDULHV VKRXOG EH LQ SODFH Position rules that specify a set of 
SRVLWLRQVDQGKRZPDQ\DFWRUVKROGHDFKRQHInformation rules that specify channels 
of communication among actors and what information must, may, or must not be 
VKDUHGDYDLODELOLW\RILQIRUPDWLRQDWHDFKGHFLVLRQQRGHAuthority rules that specify 
ZKLFKVHWRIDFWLRQVDUHDVVLJQHGWRDSRVLWLRQDWDQRGHRIGHFLVLRQWUHHAggregation 
rulesVXFKDVPDMRULW\RUXQDQLPLW\UXOHVWKDWVSHFLI\KRZWKHGHFLVLRQVRIDFWRUVDWD
QRGH DUH WR EHPDSSHG WR LQWHUPHGLDWH RU¿QDO RXWFRPHV LH D UXOH IRU VSHFLI\LQJ WKH
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQIXQFWLRQDSDUWLFXODUQRGHScope rules that specify the outcomes that 
FRXOGEHDIIHFWHGLQFOXGLQJZKHWKHURXWFRPHVDUHLQWHUPHGLDWHRUQRWPayoff rules 
WKDWVSHFLI\KRZEHQH¿WVDQGFRVWVDUHWREHGLVWULEXWHGWRDFWRUVLQpositions. One of the 
PRVWGLI¿FXOWSUREOHPVLQWKHVWXG\RILQVWLWXWLRQVLVWRLGHQWLI\DQGPHDVXUHLQVWLWXWLRQV
2.2.2. Action Arena
In order to analyze, predict, and explain the behavior within institutional arrangements, the 
¿UVWVWHSLQGHYHORSLQJDIUDPHZRUNLV WR LGHQWLI\a conceptual unit that is called as an 
action arena in Ostrom’s methology. The block, action arena in the framework plays a role 
as the social space where participants with diverse preferences interact, exchange goods 
DQGVHUYLFHVVROYHSUREOHPVGRPLQDWHRQHDQRWKHURU¿JKWDPRQJWKHPDQ\WKLQJVWKDW
LQGLYLGXDOVGRLQDFWLRQDUHQDV$FWLRQDUHDVSHFL¿HVWKHVLWXDWLRQDQGWKHPRWLYDWLRQDODQG
cognitive structure of an actor/participant as givens so that analysis proceeds toward the 
SUHGLFWLRQRIWKHOLNHO\EHKDYLRURILQGLYLGXDOVLQVXFKDVWUXFWXUH,QWKLVVHQVHWKH³DFWLRQ
arena” is the context in which exogenous variables combine in particular instances, leading 
over time to the observed patterns of interactions and outcome. Action arena can be 
described by both an action situation component and an actor component: an action 
situation and the actorsLQWKDWVLWXDWLRQLQ¿JXUH,,
An Action Situation: Action situation is the core of the IAD framework because 
individuals, acting on their own or as agents of organizations, observe information, select 
actions as decision making, engage in patterns of interaction, and realize outcomes from 
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their interaction. An actor situation thus can be further described by means of clusters of 
variables as working components. These variables specify the nature of the relevant actors 
as well as the resources and options they face, and thus are used for a generalization of  the 
rules of  a game. These are seven elements from which the variety of action situation can 
be constructed immensely: participants, positions, actions, outcomes, action-outcome 
OLQNDJHVLQIRUPDWLRQSD\RIIDVLQ2VWURP*DUGQHUDQG:DONHU
While the universality of these working element parts will be maintained, we can analyze 
WKHXQLTXHFRPELQDWLRQRIHOHPHQWVIRUWKHRUHWLFDOGHVFULSWLRQRIDQDFWLRQVLWXDWLRQ. Each 
working elementary part is further constituted by combinations of physical, cultural, and 
rule-ordered attributes. Note that the element links actors to an action situation, given the 
ZD\WKH\DUHFRQFHSWXDOL]HG2VWURPParticipants: Actors who have become 
SDUWLFLSDQWV LQ D VLWXDWLRQ  Positions: these are meant as placeholders to associate 
SDUWLFLSDQWVZLWKDQDXWKRUL]HGVHWRIDFWLRQVWKDWZLOOEHOLQNHGLQVRPHZD\WRRXWFRPHV
in the process. Capabilities and constraints of being in a particular position depend on the 
ZD\WKHRWKHUHOHPHQWVDUHGH¿QHGActions meant to the set of actions that participants 
on a particular positions can take at different stages of the process, corresponding to nodes 
in a decision three. In many cases of action situations, the array of potential action is 
immense so that analysis only attempts to identify the most important actions in a situation. 
Outcomes: the outcomes that participants can potentially affect through their actions. 
The potential outcome of individuals who are interacting one another in a regularized 
VHWWLQJ  Action-Outcome Linkages WKH ¿IWK HOHPHQW LV D VHW RI IXQFWLRQV WKDWPDS
DFWLRQVRISDUWLFLSDQWVLQWRUHDOL]HGRXWFRPHVLQWHUPHGLDWHRU¿QDOInformation: the 
set of information available to a participant in apposition at a stage in a process. Many 
situations only generate incomplete information due to the physical relationships and rules 
㻣㻕㻌䚷㻌In the process of IAD framework, the working parts of a game are best conceptualized as the universal working 
SDUWVRIDQ³DFWLRQVLWXDWLRQ´7RLGHQWLI\WKHUHOHYDQWVWUXFWXUDOHOHPHQWVRIDJDPHDQGSUHGLFWRXWFRPHV.LVWHU
and OstroPSURSRVHGWKDW WKHWKHRULVWKDGWRSRVLW WKHQXPEHURIDFWRUVSRVLWLRQVWKH\KHOGHJURZRU
FROXPQSOD\HUDPRXQWRILQIRUPDWLRQDYDLODEOHWRDQDFWRUVHWRIDFWLRQVWKDWDFWRUVFRXOGWDNHDWVSHFLILFQRGHV
LQDGHFLVLRQ WUHHVHWRI IXQFWLRQV WKDWPDSSHGDFWRUVDQGDFWLRQVDWGHFLVLRQQRGHV LQWR LQWHUPHGLDWHRUILQDO
RXWFRPHVRXWFRPHVWKDWDFWRUVMRLQWO\DIIHFWHGDQGEHQHILWVDQGFRVWVDVVLJQHGWRDFWLRQVand outcomes.
㻤㻕䚷㻌Properties of transformation function are determinate or stochastic in nature and the degree of uncertainty can 
vary with the situation. Examples include production function from combinations of inputs into some type of 
SURGXFWLQHFRQRPLFVLQYRWLQJVLWXDWLRQWDNHWKHV\PEROLFDFWLRQVRILQGLYLGXDOVLQWRDFROOHFWLYHGHFLVLRQ
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LQYROYHGPay-offVHWRISD\RIIVZKHUHWKHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVDVVLJQHGWRDFWLRQVDQG
RXWFRPHV7KHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVDVVLJQHGWRRXWFRPHV
Actors and Participants:  To understand and to predict how actors will behave, we need 
to make assumptions regarding actor or participant in a situation. The block, an actor (an 
LQGLYLGXDORUDFRUSRUDWHDFWRULQDIUDPHZRUNDSSURDFKLQFOXGHVDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWIRXU
FOXVWHUVRIYDULDEOHVWKHUHVRXUFHVWKDWDQDFWRUEULQJVWRDVLWXDWLRQWKHYDOXDWLRQ
DFWRUVDVVLJQ WRVWDWHVRI WKHZRUOGDQG WRDFWLRQV  WKHZD\DFWRUVDFTXLUHSURFHVV
UHWDLQDQGXVHUHVRXUFHVNQRZOHGJHFRQWLQJHQFLHVDQGLQIRUPDWLRQDQGWKHSURFHVVHV
actors use for selection of particular courses of action, 2VWURP7KHDFWRUVLQ
a situation can be interpreted as an individual or a organization as a group functioning an a 
such variety of forms of organization such as a corporate actor, NPO organization, social 
enterprise and hybrids of those. We will discuss issues and empirical evidences regarding 
DFWRUV LQVRFLDOHFRQRP\GRPDLQDVZHOODVSUR¿WRULHQWHG¿UPV LQ WKHPDUNHWGRPDLQ
chapter III. An actor’s characteristics are described as four aspects in the framework as 
IROORZV7KHUHVRXUFHVWKDWDQDFWRUEULQJVWRDVLWXDWLRQresource’s availability and 
constraints.,QDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHDOODFWRUVGRQRWSRVVHVVVXI¿FLHQWUHVRXUFHVWRWDNHDFWLRQV
available to them, individuals become facing various constraints in action situation. For 
example, actions involve budget constrain in terms of high costs, as well as the monetary 
DQGWLPHFRQVWUDLQWV7KHYDOXDWLRQDFWRUVDVVLJQWRVWDWHVRIWKHZRUOGDQGWRDFWLRQV
7KHZD\DFWRUVDFTXLUHSURFHVVUHWDLQDQGXVHUHVRXUFHVNQRZOHGJHFRQWLQJHQFLHVDQG
LQIRUPDWLRQDQG7KHSURFHVVHVDFWRUVXVHIRUVHOHFWLRQRISDUWLFXODUFRXUVHVRIDFWLRQ
Multiple-Levels in linking Action Arenas:  Regarding multiple-levels of analysis in the 
IAD approach, it is worth recognizing that there are three dimensions of actions in IAD 
framework. The differences among actions are at an operational level (such as calling on 
DORFDOSROLFHGHSDUWPHQWRUWDNLQJZDWHUIURPWKHWDSDWDFROOHFWLYHFKRLFHOHYHOVXFKDV
PDNLQJSROLFLHVUHJDUGLQJVSHHGOLPLWVRQORFDOURDGVRUDWDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOOHYHOVXFKDV
revising constitutional provisions about the authority of municipalities to make collective-
㻥㻕䚷㻌 ,Q WKHRU\D³VLQJOH´DFWLRQDUHQDPD\LQFOXGHODUJHQXPEHUVRISDUWLFLSDQWVDFWRUVDQGFRPSOH[FKDLQVRI
DFWLRQV +RZHYHUVRFLDOUHDOLW\WHQGVWREHFRPSRVHGRIPXOWLSOHDUHQDVOLQNHGVHTXHQWLDOO\RUVLPXOWDQHRXVO\
Action arenas are also linked across several level of analysis.  Institutional studies need to encompass multiple 
levels of analysis because decisions made about rules at any one level are usually made within a structure of rules 
existing at a different level.
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FKRLFHGHFLVLRQV6WXGLHVFRQGXFWHGDWDPDFUROHYHOIRFXVRQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHV
These, in turn, affect the type of collective-choice decisions as they eventually impinge on 
the day-to-day decisions of citizens and/or subjects. Studies conducted at a micro level 
focus more on operational-level decisions as they are in turn affected by collective-choice 
and constitutional-choice rules, some, but not all, of which are under the control of those 
making operational decisions. Finding ways to communicate across these levels is the key 
challenge for all institutional theorists. Note that the outcomes under certain assumptions 
for natural resources, i.e. the common-pool resource are far different from new resources 
of cultural and knowledge commons as scholars such as Firschmann HWDOSRLQWRXW
when discussing in Governing Knowledge Commons.
2.2.3 Outcomes and Evaluative Criteria 
Outcomes are generated as of the outputs of a given action situation discussed above, 
in the conjunction with other closely related action situations and exogenous factors 
that might be constraints of actors. Regarding evaluative criteria that may be used by 
DFWRUV SDUWLFLSDQWVRUREVHUYHUVRIQRQSDUWLFLSDQWVDUHRQHV WRGHWHUPLQH WKHH[WHQW
of satisfaction of the results or/and need for improvement surrounding the observed 
RXWFRPHV&ULWHULDUHIOHFWPXOWLSOHDVSHFWVRIDVLWXDWLRQ LQFOXGLQJHIILFLHQF\HTXLW\
OHJLWLPDF\DFFRXQWDELOLW\ ILVFDOHTXLYDOHQFHFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKPRUDOYDOXHVRI WKH
FRPPXQLW\DQGVRUWVRIFDSDFLW\VXFKDVDGDSWDELOLW\UHVLOLHQFHVXVWDLQDELOLW\DPRQJ
others. This allows us to evaluate outcomes of activities from the diverse domains such 
as market, public and social domains. Actors’ evaluation linking observed outcomes, 
depending upon information they are able to observe, will further accelerate feedback and 
OHDUQLQJSURFHVV7KHIHHGEDFNLQWXUQPLJKWKDYHLQÀXHQFHRQDQ\FRPSRQHQWVRIWKH
㻝㻜㻕䚷㻌Given assumptions of Hardin for the storyline yielding the tragedy of the commons, remaking the story in 
terms of institutional framework with a situation arena under the underlying structural factors such as biophysical 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVFRPPXQLW\³UXOHVLQXVH´DOORZXVWRFODULI\DPHFKDQLVPWRUHVXOWLQWKHRXWFRPHXQGHUDVVXPS-
WLRQVDVZHRXWOLQHGLQFKDSWHU,,VHFWLRQ7KH³WUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQV´DOOHJRU\RIILVKHU\VLWXDWLRQE\+DU-
GLQPDNHVDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHELRSK\VLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVGHSOHWDEOHFRPPXQLW\LQGHSHQGHQWVHOILQWHUHVWHG
UDWLRQDODFWRUVDQG³UXOHVLQXVH´HYHU\VKHUPDQIRUKLPVHOIWKDWDSSO\LQWKHDFWLRQDUHQDRIfishing for lobsters. 
It also assumes the only actors in the action arena, that is, independent shermen only. Thus, the collective action 
SUREOHPSRVHGE\WKH³WUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQV´LVWKHRQO\W\SHRIVRFLDOGLOHPPDLQYROYHGLQWKHVLWXDWLRQ8QGHU
those assumptions, the outcome that ensues is scarcity, depletion, and, eventually collapses.
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IAD framework under consideration
III. Mapping Orginizations in Action Arena of the IAD framework
This section attempts to relate issues between the commons and the social economy 
domains in which the similar solutions are challenged for social problems in the action 
DUHQDZLWKLQDIUDPHZRUNDW¿JXUH,,/HDUQLQJIURPDQ,$'IUDPHZRUNZHIRFXVRQ
attributes of the institutions including both organizational entities and rules discussed 
above section II. Assuming variety of institutional arrangements such as the market and the 
state as well as the social economy, we map organizations as actors onto incentive space 
and try to measure the degree of positions in terms of actor’s behavior. Through mapping 
RUJDQL]DWLRQVLQUHDOLW\LQWRLQFHQWLYHVSDFHZHPLJKWH[WUDFWWKH³UHYHDOHGUXOHVLQXVH´
WKDWLQWXUQSURYLGHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWSDWWHUQVRIJRYHUQDQFH%\XVLQJ$VLDQFDVHVZH
get advantage of a framework approach to analyze an action situation of social economy in 
Asian contexts, although results from these studies are preliminary. We expect some 
¿QGLQJVSURYLGHXV FOXHVRI ³UXOHLQXVH´ IRU WKH IXWXUH UHVHDUFKRQ VWXG\LQJ VWUXFWXUDO
elements of action arenas in the IAD framework.  
3.1 Governing Social Economy Organizations and the Commons
Recent research regarding social economy and organizations emphasize collective action 
theory which focus on pay-off function. However, in order to have policy implications, 
it is necessary for us to pay more attention on the role of interaction among actors in 
RUGHU WRVROYH³VRFLDOGLOHPPD´ WKDWKDYHQRWEHHQVROYHGE\ WKHFRQYHQWLRQDO W\SHV
of institutional arrangements UHSUHVHQWHGE\³WKHPDUNHW´DQG³WKHVWDWHJRYHUQPHQW´
This is a perspective beyond the dichotomy to complex dynamic economy. The view 
implies that we need a novel perspective and need to theorize not only rules/principles of 
competition but also those of cooperation in consideration of theory, practice and policy, 
3DUN7KLVYLHZLVDOVRFRQVLVWHQWZLWKRQHRI,$'IUDPHZRUNDSSURDFKLQ WKDW
cooperation is the decisive organizing principle of human society. 
㻝㻝㻕䚷㻌7KURXJKILYHPHFKDQLVPVIRUWKHHYROXWLRQRIFRRSHUDWLRQE\1RZDNZHFDQGLVFXVVWKDWFRRSHUDWLRQ
is needed for evolution to construct a new level of organization or community.Through the seminal research of 
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3.2 Mapping Organizations in Reality
This section explores the unexplored domain of the civic sector and social economy in the 
economic system at large and then attempts to open the possibility to link one situation of 
³VRFLDOHFRQRP\RUJDQL]DWLRQV6(2V´DVDFWRUVWRWKHDWWULEXWHVWRDQRWKHUVLWXDWLRQRIWKH
³&RPPRQV´7KHUHLVQRRQHJHQHUDOO\DFFHSWDEOHGH¿QLWLRQRUFRQFHSWRIVRFLDOHFRQRP\
GRPDLQ6('DQG6(2V,QRUGHUWR¿OOLQWKHVHJDSVZHDGRSWDIUDPHZRUNDSSURDFK
and set up a criteria of incentives and draw common attributes of SEOs which make up the 
components of a full spectrum economy with which the theories are compatible, based on 
WKHDFFXPXODWHG UHVXOWVRI WKHSUHYLRXV VWXGLHV VXFKDVFDVHVDQG¿HOGZRUNV%DVHGRQ
historical episodes and recent practices from the contemporary East Asia region, we are 
able to discuss issues in both practice and policy, while we propose theoretical ones as a 
research agenda. In order to make up the lack of comparative study for both evolution of 
social economy and the emergence of social economy organizations within the Asian 
region as a whole, we then pay attention to categorizing properties of organizations for 
Asian regions to clarify similarities and hetero-properties among the regions. Though it is 
yet an early stage of re-search concerning novel institutional mechanisms, in particular 
forms of social economy which share with characteristics with the commons, it is worth 
noting it as a contribution of our study to the incentive parameters space in the model with 
trade-offEHWZHHQYDOXHFUHDWLRQDQGYDOXHDSSURSULDWLRQLQWKLVDUWLFOH7KHVSDFHUHÀHFWV
some of structural aspects of institutions including organizations and rules as in the IAD 
framework. The value creation is close to valuation of institutional arrangement based on 
the commons, while the value appropriation tends to put with more weight to the market 
DUUDQJHPHQW7KHSHUVSHFWLYHUHSUHVHQWHGE\WKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHVSDFHDVLQ)LJXUH,,,LV
useful for researcher to explain actions of social economy organizations under the situations 
㻝㻞㻕䚷㻌3UHYLRXVVWXGLHVKDYHWULHGPDSSLQJFULWHULDRI6('DQG6(2'HIRXUQ\DQG'HYHOWHUH(8.LP
DQG0LXUDDQG'HIRXUQ\DQG.LP7KHHIIRUWVKDYHFRQWULEXWHGKHOSLQWHJUDWHGYDULRXVIDFWRUVLQ
a simple framework. However, those methods are in the lack of compatibility with theoretical perspectives with
which all types of organizations are interacting each other for activities and transactions across domains in the ar-
FKLWHFWXUHRIHFRQRP\DWODUJH6HH3DUN
Ostrom(1990, 2010) explain polycentric governance (governing Commons). The design principles, or rules in a 
broad sense including both rules-in-use and rules-informal that are core factors that affect the probability of long-
term survival of an institution (or organizations and rules) developed by users of a resource in specifics, or/and 
direct stake-holders of the commons in general. 
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where both market and government failures may simultaneously may arise.   
$VWKHSUHOLPLQDU\¿QGLQJVIURPWKH)LJXUH,,,UHSUHVHQWLQJWKHSRVLWLRQRI6(2VZH
argue that SED and SEOs in the East Asian economy at large are in the process of expanding 
and repositioning stages by combining such hetero-factors as external, internal and policy-
oriented factors. It is not necessary to be consistent with properties of SEOs. Distribution 
of SEOs are in the early stage of evolution and at the divergent pattern which is consistent 
ZLWK WKH DUHD RI WKH XSSHUULJKW FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WKH K\EULG SDWWHUQ LQ )LJXUH ,,, 7KH
distribution of SEOs in the incentive space in our study indicates that there is an increasing 
tendency for SEOs to shift toward on boundary over the dual values of both value creation 
DQGYDOXHDSSURSULDWLRQ2XUUHVXOWGLIIHUVIURP/HHHWDODQG'HIRXU\DQG.LP
in that we have integated SEOs into a simple but more compatible incentive space.
0HWKRG%DVHGGRFXPHQWVRI¿HOGVWXGLHVWKHPDMRU6(2VDVLQVWLWXWLRQDODFWRUVSOD\HUVDUHPDSSLQJ
onto East Asian Domains of Economic System under the incentive structure. 
㻝㻟㻕䚷 7KHSURSHUWLHVDQGWKHDVVRFLDWHGSULQFLSOHVRIVRFLDOHFRQRP\RUJDQL]DWLRQ6(2VDUHVXPPDUL]HGDWWKHSDSHU
WKDWDGRSWV(0(6DSSURDFKSURSRVHGE\'HIRXUQ\DQG1\VVHQV
)LJXUH,,,$UFKLWHFWXUHRIWKH&RQWHPSRUDU\(FRQRPLHVMapping Evolution of Institutional 
Actors onto Domains of Economic System
+LJK
Degree of
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Domain for social entrepreneurship
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 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1RWHIRUFRGHVIRUQDUURZGRPDLQZKHUHRUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHUHFRJQL]HGDVLQVWLWXWLRQDORUDUHFHUWL¿HGLQthe legal frame: 
legal status as institutional actors and  for broad domain as implicit actors including Korea: co-operative(CPsk), local 
FRPPXQLW\ HQWHUSULVH/&(VN VRFLDO HQWHUSULVH6(VN VHOIVXI¿FLHQF\ HQWHUSULVH（LSEsk), social co-operative
(SCPsk), general co-operative(SPGsk). Japan: NPOhojin(NPOHjp), co-operative organization(COOHjp), general 
business organization (GBOHjp), VHOIHPSOR\HG EXVLQHVV 6(%MS&KLQD QRQ SUR¿W HQWHUSULVH 13(FQ, farmers’ 
specialized co-operatives (FSCcs), welfare enterprise (WEcs), general business enterprise organization  (GBOcs). Kim 
DQG0LXUD6RFLDO¿QDQFLDOHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS6)(VRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQRI¿QDQFLDO6(26,)6(2FRPPHUFLDO
¿QDQFLDOHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS&)(FRPPHUFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQRI¿QDQFLDOEXVLQHVV&,)%6RXUFH3DUN
3RVLWLRQLQJ6(2VLQWKH(FRQRP\DWODUJH7KHVH¿QGLQJVDUHWHQWDWLYHEHFDXVHWKHUHVXOWV
are based the partial set of attributes affecting the structure of action arena where 
organizations as actors do their decision making for their own through interacting with 
others. Thus, the resulting aggregate actions are outcomes described in the framework 
approach adopted in this article.
IV. Discussion for New Commons
Concerning academic challenges for applying lessons from traditional commons to the 
new commons, it is worth adopting the approach from Ostrom(1990) and Ostrom, 
Gradner and Walker(1994) and applying the framework approach into borrows the 
knowledge  and cultural environment by employing methods from Madison et.al(2010). 
Recognizing knowledge as a new commons, scholars argue that, given the use of both 
formal law and informal rule systems in commons governance, patterns of interactions are 
inseparable from the outcomes of commons systems. As one important distinction from 
the traditional commons, they point it out how people interact with rules, resources, and 
each other, in other words, is itself an outcome in a sense that it is inextricably linked with 
the form and content of the knowledge or informational output of the commons14).  
,W LVDOVRZRUWKQRWLQJDQHZZD\RI ORRNLQJDWNQRZOHGJHDVD VKDUHG UHVRXUFH ,W LV
important for scholars and policymakers to become to recognize it as a complex system 
that is a commons, meaning a resource shared by a group of people (that segment of 
population may be called as a community in a dimension) that is subject to social dilemmas.
 
.QRZOHGJHLQDEURDGGH¿QLWLRQFDQEHGH¿QHGDVDEURDGVHWRILQWHOOHFWXDODQGFXOWXUDO
UHVRXUFHV,WUHIHUVDOOW\SHVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJJDLQHGWKURXJKH[SHULHQFHRUVWXG\ZKHWKHU
LQGLJHQRXVVFLHQWL¿FVFKRODUO\RURWKHUZLVHQRQDFDGHPLF)RUH[DPSOH LW LQFOXGHVDOO
㻝㻠㻕䚷㻌As an example, they explain the open source software program, and the existence and operation of the relevant
open source software license are constitutive of one another.
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intelligible ideas, information, and data. It may also include creative works such as music 
and the visual and theatrical arts, conventional and contemporary. There are important 
differences between various forms of resources. Some scholars think that knowledge 
derives from information as information derives from data, while others distinguish it in an 
opposite way in that data being raw bit of information, information being organized data in 
context, and knowledge being the assimilation of the information and understanding of 
KRZWRXVHLW+HVVDQG2VWURP)XUWKHUPRUHFODVVLFIUDPHZRUNVVXFKDV3RODQ\L
 YLHZV WKDW DFTXLULQJ DQG GLVFRYHULQJ NQRZOHGJH LV ERWK D VRFLDO SURFHVV DQG D
deeply personal process. 
7KHQHZZD\RIORRNLQJNQRZOHGJHLV³QRYHO´EHFDXVHLWDOORZVXVWRYLHZNQRZOHGJHDV
dual and polemical: both commodity and a constitutive force of society. The complex 
nature of the knowledge resource comes from this dual functionality as an economic good 
and a human need. It is the place and the reason where and why scholars and policymakers 
employ an institutional framework approach to identify attributes within the coherent 
framework when addressing problems under dilemma situations. Given the background on 
the knowledge above, knowledge commons refers to the institutionalized community 
governanceRURUJDQL]DWLRQJRYHUQDQFHRIsharing and, in some case, creation of a wide 
range of intellectual and cultural resources. For research purpose, the notion is useful to 
capture and study a broad and inclusive scope of commons institutions and to examine 
governance of knowledge commons.
There are efforts to develop and apply a research framework to investigate the new 
common, knowledge commons on a systematic basis. In his section, we only introduce the 
relational aspects of a situation in terms of IAD framework where knowledge as a resource 
and its commons as institutional governance are involved. The attribute form knowledge 
UHVRXUFHDV WKH³FRQVWUXFWHG´FRPPRQV LV UHÀHFWHG LQ2VWURP¶V ,$'IUDPHZRUNE\ WKH
collapse of the distinction between outcome and patterns of interaction that results from the 
LQWHUVHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH FRPPRQV ³DFWLRQ DUHQD´ DQG WKH XQGHUO\LQJ VWUXFWXUDO IDFWRUV
㻝㻡㻕㻌䚷㻌Lessons from framework based on research works by Ostrom allow us to extend well beyond natural 
environmental resources. Recently academic efforts to apply Ostrom’s institutional approach to commons in the 
cultural environment or knowledge commonsDUH)ULVFKPDQQDQG0DGLVRQ)ULVFKPDQQDQG6WUDQGEXUJ
0)6 among others. The scholars in law and economics also have paid attention to the novel notion of 
shared resources and property arrangements. 
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such as community attributes, resource attributes, and rules-in-use. This is important 
LPSOLFDWLRQLQWKDWUHFRJQL]LQJDQGUHUH¿QLQJNQRZOHGJHUHVRXUFHDVFRPPRQVKDYHVRFLDO
dimension that is measured through interfaces among working components within the 
institutional framework, the commons action arena and the structural variables in the 
framework. 
It is useful for us to re-examine the relationship between the use/allocation of the resource 
and spectrum of property ownership when we consider the knowledge resource and 
institutional governance. Here we discuss two issues that contribute to develop the 
institutional framework for economic activities in the new common environments: one is 
the linkage between mixing property and economic activity, the other is the notion of 
contingency in spectrum of the shared resource as the commonVKRZQLQ¿JXUH,9
The linkage between mixing property and economic activity7KH ¿UVW GLVFXVVLRQZLOO
H[WHQG QRWLRQ RI ³PL[LQJ SURSHUW\´ WKDW WKH VSHFWUXPRI SURSHUW\ UHJLPHV VXUURXQGLQJ
UHVRXUFHVLQTXHVWLRQDVFRPELQLQJSULYDWHFRPPRQDQGSXEOLFWUDLWVGHHSO\UHODWHGWR
HDFKRWKHU&ROH0DQ\SURSHUW\UHJLPHVDVLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWLQYDULRXV
contexts can be viewed as combining private, common, and public traits. We call it as a 
tri-layered regime in this study. We argue that a tri-layered regime corresponds to a tri-
layered economy with the three domains of such economic activities as market economy, 
public economy and social economy. The linkage helps us clarify the overlapping domains 
Resouce
Characteristics
Attributes of the
Community
Patterns of
Interactions
Evaluative
Criteria
Rules-in-Use
Action Situations
Actors
ACTION  ARENA
)LJXUH,9$)UDPHZRUNIRU$QDO\]LQJ1HZ&RPPRQV.QRZOHGJH&RPPRQV 
6RXUFHDGRSWHGIURP0DGLVRQHWDO
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or interaction between heterogeneous domains of activities over the mixing form of 
property and resources in both theoretical and empirical aspects.  The notion of contingency 
in spectrum of the shared resource as the common: The second discussion is to introduce 
WKH FRQFHSW RI FRQWLQJHQF\ LQWR WKH H[LVWLQJ PRGHO E\ UHGH¿QLQJ WKH GXDO PRGHO RI
FRPPRQVGUDPDZLWKWZRSROHVDQGWKXVPDNLQJWKHVFDOHSUREOHPEHPRUHVSHFL¿FRU
PHDVXUDEOHLQWHUPRIERWKDSSOLFDWLRQDQGWKHRU\:HQHHGWRFODULI\WKHVHLQWKHVHQVHWKDW
they explicitly seek to balance private, common, and public interests as having more or less 
HTXDOZHLJKWVRWKDWWKH\FDQEHVHHQDVJHQXLQHtrilateral or tri-layered property regimes. 
In the cultural environment such as information and knowledge commons, it is necessary 
for scholars to have to recognize the heterogeneous aspect of the new commons and have 
to develop the novel notion to extend scope and scale in continuous way, rather simple 
GLVFUHWHZD\$VZH VHH WKH GLDJUDP DW WKH ¿JXUH ,9 WKH FRSH RI ERXQGDULHV LQ WKH
VSHFWUXPRISURSHUW\UHVRXUFHVLVÀH[LEOHDQGG\QDPLF7KHDFWLRQDUHQDQHHGVDPHFKDQLVP
to transform from economic activity domain to the property regimes, that is, resource 
ownership domain. Scopes of knowledge resource commons are contingent on the 
underlying structural factors. In other words, it is determined by not only the attributes of 
resource but also attributes of community(or governance mechanism where the participatory 
VHJPHQWRISRSXODWLRQDUHLQYROYHGDVGHVFULEHGDW¿JXUH,9
Concluding Remark
The conventional economics had been built upon the dichotomy of market-state/government.
7KH ELJ XQDQVZHUHG TXHVWLRQ LV KRZ IDU WKH WKLQJV WKDW HFRQRPLVWV KDYH OHDUQW DERXW
       Pr ivate                                               C ommon   
 
 
self       labor      cattle       land        streams      air TXDOLWy     environs 
)LJXUH,95HVRXUFHVDQG0L[HG2ZQHUVKLS6SHFWUXPDQG6FDOH
6RXUFH7KH UHYLVHG GLDJUDP DGRSWHG IURP)HQQHOO 1RWH7KH GLDJUDP VKRZV KRZ D JLYHQ
UHVRXUFHV\VWHPPLJKWGLYLGHWKHLQGLYLGXDOO\DQGFRPPRQO\RZQHGRUFRQWUROOHGJRYHUQHGHOHPHQWV
streams     air               knowledge
sea            spatial         cultural
                environs      environs
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WUDGLWLRQDO FRPPRQV DSSO\ WR WKH ³QHZ FRPPRQV´7KH HFRQRPLFV RI GLYHUVHDFWLYLW\
GRPDLQVLQFOXGLQJWKHQHZFRPPRQVLVVWLOOLQLWVLQIDQF\,WLVWRRVRRQWREHFRQ¿GHQW
DERXWLWVK\SRWKHVHV%XWLWPD\\HWSURYHDXVHIXOZD\RIWKLQNLQJDERXWVRFLDOSUREOHPV
and alternative solutions, such as managing the new type of  infrastructure, the new type of 
knowledge as intellectual property or the new scale of problem and dilemma, on which 
policymakers need all the help they consider new type of governance and institutional 
arrangement. As we learned lessons from a framework approach, the scope and scale of the 
commons as resource are contingent on the structural factors and actions so that we need 
more effort to specify situations under which actors (or participants, community members 
DWERWKRQOLQHDQGRIÀLQHVHDUFKLQJWKHVROXWLRQVIRUVRFLDOSUREOHPVRUFRPPRQVGLOHPPDV
As preliminary results, we summarize major points as follows. Regarding a framework 
approach, First, the framework approach allows us to identify the major types of structural 
variables that should be used to analyze all types of settings relevant for the framework 
DGDSWHGLQTXHVWLRQE\SUHVHQWLQJWRVRPHH[WHQWLQDOOLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVWKRXJK
value of variables may differ according to different institutional arrangement. Second, An 
IAD framework is a multi-tier conceptual map which divides the investigation of such 
variables into blocks or groups. It is an useful approach for understanding of the new 
commons as the constructed common resources in cultural environments, though it had 
LQLWLDOO\EHHQGHYHORSHGE\2VWURPDQGRWKHUGLVFLSOLQHVRULHQWHGUHVHDUFKHUV IRU
natural common-pool resources. Third, as issues regarding actors in the action arena within 
the framework approach, the economic theories in the mainstream economics is not yet 
able to explain existence of actors in social economy domain such as SEOs properly, remaining 
WKHPEHVLGHVWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHPDUNHWDQGVWDWHIDLOXUHV7KHJDSFRXOGEHIXO¿OOHGWKURXJK
DGRSWLQJDQGEXLOGLQJWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNLQRUGHUWRUHÀHFWUHDOZRUOGVLWXDWLRQ
Regarding the study provides an institutional storyline about how to link the commons 
and the social economy in terms of actors in conjunction with governance mechanism. 
Frist, in the architecture of the economic system, a tri-layered socio-macro economy in this 
article, HDFKW\SHRIHFRQRPLFDFWRUSHUIRUPVDVSHFL¿FLQVWLWXWLRQDOUROHWKDWH[SODLQVDQG
MXVWL¿HVWKHLUH[LVWHQFHDVDGLVWLQFWLQVWLWXWLRQLQWKHHFRQRP\DQGVRFLHW\LQTXHVWLRQ7KH
three central actors in the full spectrum economy are governments in public domain and 
corporation (business organization) in market domain as an institutional arrangement 
― 320 ―
―29―
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework:
Mapping and Governing the Tri-layered Economy with the Shared Resources toward a Novel Commons
based on establishment of private property ownership, and social entrepreneurs (SEOs) in 
social economy domain as an institutional arrangement with governance mechanism over 
WKHFRPPRQVLQTXHVWLRQ6HFRQGWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRI6(2VLQ(DVW$VLDVHHPVWREHLQWKH
early stage of evolution but the structure of SEDs shows the divergent pattern correspond-
ing the hybrid pattern, indicating that there is an increasing tendency for SEOs to shift to-
ward on boundary over the dual values of both value creation and value appropriation. 
Regarding challenges of this article, there are two contributions in the discussion regarding 
WKH QHZ FRPPRQ VXFK DV JRYHUQLQJ NQRZOHGJH FRPPRQV $V ¿UVW FRQWULEXWLRQ IRU
H[WHQGLQJ WUDGLWLRQDO FRPPRQV WKH VWXG\ H[WHQGV QRWLRQRI ³PL[LQJSURSHUW\´ WKDW WKH
VSHFWUXP RI SURSHUW\ UHJLPHV VXUURXQGLQJ UHVRXUFHV LQ TXHVWLRQ DV FRPELQLQJ SULYDWH
common, and public traits. We argue that a tri-layered regime corresponds to a tri-layered 
economy with the three domains of such economic activities as market economy, public 
economy and social economy. The linkage helps us clarify the overlapping domains or 
interaction between heterogeneous domains of activities over the mixing form of property 
and resources in both theoretical and empirical aspects. Recognizing the heterogeneous 
DVSHFWRIWKHQHZFRPPRQVVFRSHDQGVFDOHLVÀH[LEOHDQGG\QDPLFEHFDXVHERXQGDULHVLQ
the spectrum of property resources are changing in continuous way, rather simple discrete 
way. Second contribution is to introduce the concept of contingency into the existing model 
E\UHGH¿QLQJWKHGXDOPRGHORIFRPPRQVGUDPDZLWKWZRSROHVDQGWKXVPDNLQJWKHVFDOH
SUREOHPEHPRUHVSHFL¿FRUPHDVXUDEOHLQWHUPRIERWKDSSOLFDWLRQDQGWKHRU\:HQHHG
to clarify these in the sense that they explicitly seek to balance private, common, and public 
LQWHUHVWVDVKDYLQJPRUHRUOHVVHTXDOZHLJKWVRWKDWWKH\FDQEHVHHQDVJHQXLQHWULODWHUDO
or tri-layered property regimes. 
In summary, facing new needs and social dilemma in conjunction with the sustainable 
development for maturing society, scholars of various disciplines including social science 
need the interaction in a cooperative and constructive way to develop a theoretical 
framework for  prescription toward the divers situations in reality. Adopting and applying 
IAD framework approach is a start one step toward building the novel one. For example, it 
is necessary for government in the public domain and SEOs in the social economy domain 
WRZRUNWRJHWKHULQRUGHUWRGHYHORSSROLFHVWRHQKDQFHWKH¿QDQFLDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\RIWKH
sector, rather introducing independently from others. This is because there is no one simple 
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mechanism that can serve as a panacea to sustainability problem, given an inter-connected 
DQGXQEDODQFHGHYROXWLRQRI¿QDQFLDODVSHFWVEHWZHHQPDUNHWGRPDLQDQGQRQPDUNHWRQH
The research agenda for the future is to re-visit those properties and principles in terms of 
policy issues within institutional framework in order to have a deeper theoretical and policy 
implications for the full-spectrum macro-economy.
The institutions that humans devise to regulate the use of natural common-pool resources 
must somehow try to cope with governance and incentive problems. They struggle with 
how to ensure contributions to the mechanisms used to maintain both the resource and the 
LQVWLWXWLRQLWVHOI7KHUHVHHPVZLGHURRPIRUXVWRLGHQWLI\³QHZFRPPRQV´LQWKHFXOWXUDO
environment or to claim as commons things not always seen that way. The recent study of 
the Commons are extending the concept of the commons from traditional natural resources 
toward things such as medicine, knowledge accumulation, cultural outcomes and goods 
and what are usually seen as local public goods and global public goods, like the cities and 
cultural capital and heritage cites among others.
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共有資源から新コモンズの持つ経済社会のマッピングとガバナンス
IAD制度分析発展フレーム・ワーク
朴　哲洙
   要　　約
本論文は，社会的なジレンマに直面し，自発的に参加する人々のグループや組織により
共有・利用される多様な資源ストックと生み出される財・サービスに関する新しい観点と
分析方法を導入することを意図している。従来の市場領域・政府領域の二分法を越える多
様な制度調整を含む経済社会問題分析のためのフレームワークを設定する。オストローム
らが開拓したアプローチの採用により，社会的経済領域内の組織および経済活動領域にお
けるガバナンスと構造の理解を深めるとともに，文化的な環境における新コモンズとして
知識コモンズの構築と制度調整を究明するプラットフォームを提供すると主張する。
Keywords: 社会的ジレンマ,  制度分析発展フレームワーク・ IAD framework,  共有資源,  新コモンズ,  ガ
バナンス,  政策過程,  市場・国家二分法,  三領域マクロ経済社会体制,  社会的企業組織. 
-(/&ODVVL¿FDWLRQ1XPEHUV%(*++2333.
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